Part 1: How to Predict Postseason Success in Baseball



Just how did the Red Sox get past the Rays and Tigers in 2013?

Introduction

“They got hot at the right moment.” “They’re just lucky they peaked in October.” “It was just meant to be.”

These are all things that have been said about recent World Series winners. Ever since Major League Baseball switched to its current three-division system (and after adding a second wild card in 2012), it has made it more difficult for teams with the best records to win it all. This is because probably more than any other sport, baseball’s playoffs are so much different than its regular season.

Baseball’s 162-game regular season is a marathon of endurance and mental toughness. On the other hand, the playoffs are a sprint, with the winner often times being a team that by all traditional metrics (such as wins and winning percentage) is inferior. However, it is extremely difficult to predict when such a team will go on a World Series run. Even though there are several metrics to measure a player’s overall value to his team (such as WAR, or Wins Above Replacement), there is not a lot when it comes to statistics or groups of statistics that can best predict postseason success.

Michael Lewis’s Moneyball introduced the importance of on-base percentage (OBP) to many baseball fans, but I have determined through a simple regression analysis that statistic alone does not correlate to team postseason success. The general consensus among fans, commentators, and analysts is that having dominant pitching, particularly starting pitching, is the key to advancing far in the playoffs.

I agree that the most important variable on a playoff team is their starting pitching, but pitching alone doesn’t win you the World Series either. The 2013 postseason saw the Boston Red Sox in the ALCS beat the Detroit Tigers, a team that had what was considered to be the most dominant starting rotation in baseball. This was after they beat another team with excellent pitching, the Tampa Bay Rays, in the previous series. In a sport that has metrics to measure everything from speed on the base paths to the strength of an outfielder’s arm, there is no accepted metric that can accurately and consistently predict postseason success based on regular season performance. My goal was to see if I could find such a measure.

This is not a simple task. In an October 2013 article for ESPN’s Grantland, Rany Jazayerli wrote, “Trying to find the magic formula for postseason success has been the sabermetric community's version of trying to turn lead into gold: Many have tried, but none have entirely succeeded.” I first came up with the idea for this project after angrily watching the New York Yankees over the past decade consistently be one of the best teams in the league, but then lose in the postseason (often in in the division series).

Most fans and analysts pointed to the Yankees’ lack of quality starting pitchers post-2003 to why they couldn’t win in the playoffs after winning four of five World Series from 1996 to 2001. However, the Atlanta Braves, led by their dominating pitching trio of Greg Maddux, Tom Glavine and John Smoltz, had even more trouble in the postseason, winning only one World Series title from 1992 to 2005, despite winning the NL East title in all fourteen years. It amazed me how these teams could consistently dominate their respective divisions and leagues for 162 games, only to come out flat in a five or seven game series. It made me wonder if there were hints in a playoff team’s regular season statistics that could predict a successful postseason run.

For this research, I have defined postseason success as “playoff value” or PV. A PV of 1 means losing in the division series, 2 means losing in the Championship Series, 3 is losing in the World Series, and 4 is winning the World Series. Therefore, in order to find statistics that can predict postseason success, I ran hundreds of linear regression models, with the outcome variable PV, and with many different predictors.

Ability to Drive in Runs Without Hitting Home Runs
 

Hypothesis

For my research, I decided to focus mainly on regular season batting statistics of playoff teams from the past ten years (2003-2012). I did this for a few reasons. First off, as previously mentioned, it is widely accepted that good pitching beats good hitting in the playoffs. However, I think this only holds true when looking at conventional measures of “good” hitting, such as batting average and runs scored. Instead, it could be more important to look at team batting patterns and tendencies. It is my hypothesis that teams that have more simplistic batting approaches, or those that emphasize contact and putting the ball in play and deemphasize over-swinging to try to hit home runs, will be more successful in the postseason. The reasoning behind this is that the pitchers in the postseason are so dominating (the number of off days in the postseason means that teams usually only use three or four of their best starters), a team might only get one or two chances a game to get a rally going or drive in runs. And because the top pitchers in the playoffs, are usually less likely to give up home runs, it is important that when given the proper opportunity, teams are able to drive in runs without hitting home runs.

Results

I started by using the stepwise regression function in R in which, I predicted PV from the original 38 statistics I gathered. These statistics ranged from simplistic, such as hits and home runs, to advanced, such weighted on base average (wOBA) and weighted runs create plus per 600 plate appearances, to contact-based, such as groundball percentage and home run to fly ball ratio. The stepwise function took all possible predictors and entered and removed them from the regression model until all predictors in the model had a p value of less than .1.

The stepwise function gave me the following: PV ~ H + HR + BABIP + GBFB + LDp + HRFB + BUH + Swingp + Contactp. What this meant was that playoff value could be predicted by the combination of hits, home runs, batting average on balls in play, ground ball to fly ball ratio, line drive percentage, home run to fly ball ratio, bunt hits, swing percentage and contact percentage. After finding the summary of this model, I discovered it was statistically significant, as it had a p value of .038.

I was not surprised by a few aspects of the formula, as teams with higher LDp (line drive percentage) and GBFB (ground ball to fly ball ratio) stats usually mean they have more simplistic hitting approaches, as higher rates of hitting line drives and ground balls means that they aren’t over-swinging or trying to only hit home runs as much. However, it is very difficult to interpret these individual coefficients, due to the multicollinearity of the model.

This multicollinearity is caused by the high correlation between the variables in this model. For example, teams that usually have more hits are going to have more home runs, and a higher Batting Average on Balls in Play. After trying several other models that included variables that I thought would be significant (such as contact percentage, line drive percentage and zone contact percentage) I was still unable to find another model that was statistically significant, so I came up with another idea.

Be sure to check back tomorrow for Part 2 of Andrew's analysis.

The Weekly Rant: The Mixed Incentives of MLB's International Spending Limits

During the last CBA negotiations, MLB owners had to find areas in which they could restrain spending.  The league's ever-increasing revenues were directed not only into free agent salaries, but also into bonuses for amateur players from both North America and around the world.

While the Players Association resisted changes that would limit big league salaries (excepting the disastrous Qualifying Offer/Draft Pick Compensation scheme), they were certainly willing to budge on amateur spending.  Spending in the First-Year Player Draft (in which amateurs from the United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico participate) had increased dramatically as teams recognized the value in acquiring cost-controllable, young talent.

Similarly, amateurs from the rest of the world (mostly Latin America and Asia) saw their signing bonuses grow richer and richer in an unrestrained market place.  International amateurs could negotiate with any team, meaning they could receive more than equally talented U.S. players, who could only negotiate with the team that drafted them.

A "hard-slotting" system was agreed upon for the draft, which significantly limited what teams could spend on each pick (and the draft as a whole).  The new rules were a significant achievement for Major League Baseball, in that the spending pattern was not only stunted, but reversed.  Harsh penalties, including loss of future high-round draft picks as well as 100% taxes on overspending, have been effective as disincentives; draft spending decreased by over 11% the year after the new rules went into effect.

The clubs weren't as successful in crafting a new policy for international spending.  Many felt that an international draft would be the next logical step to contain spending and also to allocate talent more equitably across the league.  But a laundry list of possible difficulties caused the two sides to table the idea until after the CBA was negotiated*.

*In fact, an international draft may be a long ways off.  Sources I've talked to have said that neither side is really that unhappy with the current arrangement, and it may be more trouble than it's worth to implement a full international draft.

Instead, teams have "bonus pools" for international spending, just as they do in the draft. Players are still free to negotiate with all 30 teams, but some teams have more bonus pool money available (the amounts are determined using reverse-order standings of the previous season). In theory, this system should work just as effectively as hard-slotting in the draft.  But in reality, spending did not decrease, and may actually increase in coming seasons.

Unlike in the draft, the penalties for overspending are just not harsh enough in the international market.  Teams do face escalating taxes on overspending, along with reductions on spending during the next year.  But these disincentives did not deter the Cubs or Rangers from spending millions more than their allotted bonus poll during the most recent signing period.

While those two teams spent more than $8 MM each, the Yankees are prepared to make a mockery of the system.  Some reports estimate the New York club will spend upwards of $18 MM on prospects, which would result in over $12 MM in penalties.  They would be very restricted in the next season's international class, but there is just too much incentive to break the rules.

The return on investment for amateur talent by all lines of thinking is really quite high. Landing just one star player can result in tens of millions of surplus value during pre-arbitration and arbitration seasons. And while money isn't everything in scouting and signing top prospects, it certainly helps.  Some teams obviously feel that there is more to be gained by spending a great deal in one season to land a bunch of top prospects (and basically sitting it out the next year), than by signing one or two highly touted players each July 2.

This will be a perfect storm once the Yankees really get involved.  First, there are the diminishing marginal costs (once you go over by a little bit, it makes sense to go over by a lot).  Then you have a team that has seen its spending in other areas slowed by tougher penalties. The competitive balance tax curtails the free agent market. Hard-slotting restricts draft spending.  The Yankees are severely limited on ways they can spend money efficiently.

Additionally, the Yankees have struggled to add impact talent through the draft (as a result of both their later draft positions and general under-performance in scouting, signing, and developing talent).  It's easy to see why they are prepared to go crazy on this coming year's crop of international amateurs.

Obviously this isn't what Bud Selig envisioned when the new system was drawn up; big market teams like the Cubs, Rangers, and Yankees buying up the top rated prospects from around the world while small market teams fight for the scraps.  One way to change this would be through the previously discussed international draft.

In absence of that possibility, harsher restrictions are needed.  More severe taxes would be the easiest and least intrusive penalty to implement. I would favor more severe and effective disincentives, such as the loss of draft picks for anything worse than minor overspending.  That penalty has worked thus far for hard-slotting, and I think it could be employed similarly in the international market.


Feature Image courtesy of MLB.com.

The Evil Empire: Evaluating the 2014 New York Yankees Offseason

Those "Damn Yankees" are at it again. Last season, the Yanks failed to make the postseason for just the 2nd time in the last 19 years, and the first time since the 2008 season. We all remember what took place in the '09 offseason, as the Bombers went all out to sign the top three free agents on the market - Mark Teixeira, A.J. Burnett, and CC Sabathia.

The team proceeded to win the World Series the following year, with each of the big acquisitions playing key roles; the Steinbrenners certainly hope to replicate those results as seen by the team's trademark free-spending ways thus far this offseason. There were rumbling that management and ownership were supposedly going to make a concerted effort to get under the $189 million luxury tax threshold, but this was laughable from the get-go.

Sure it would have been nice to get under this mark to avoid paying yet another massive tax bill, but it's the Yankees we're talking about. Without further adieu here's an assessment of the Yankees offseason:

Signings
- Joe Girardi (4 year, $16 million): Somehow managed to guide the injury-plagued Yanks to 85 wins. Girardi absolutely deserves to be the 2nd highest manager in the game now, and his 4th place finish in the AL Manager of the Year race displays the respect he garnered after last season.
- Brian McCann (5 year, $85 million): The team got no production whatsoever from the catcher position last year so making a splash right away by signing the 7x All-Star was no surprise.
- Jacoby Ellsbury (7 year, $153 million): The 2x World Series champ got paid like a perennial All-Star despite never making an appearance in the "Midsummer Classic". If Ellsbury can manage to stay healthy though he could definitely take advantage of the short porch in right field for years to come.
- Carlos Beltran (3 year, $45 million): After getting shunned by the Bombers as a free agent in 2005, the veteran finally has the chance to play in the Bronx. Beltran has a lot left in the tank and can still field the position very well.
- Masahiro Tanaka (7 year, $155 million): The Japanese sensation has extremely high expectations to live up to after signing the 5th highest paid contract of all time for pitcher. The Yanks have failed miserably in the past with Japanese pitchers such as Kei Igawa and Hideki Irabu so they better hope Tanaka pans out to be more than just a consistent, third starter.

Departures 
- Robinson Cano (10 year, $240 million to Mariners): Even though he's clearly the best second baseman in the game it was definitely the right move on the Yankees part. No player is worth that kind of contract, and Robbie may struggle to put up the same numbers in the pitcher-friendly confines of Safeco Field.
- Curtis Granderson (4 year, $60 million to Mets): The Yanks felt like it was time to let Grandy walk following a last season due to injuries. Like Cano, Granderson might struggle a bit playing across town in Citi Field these next few years.
- Alex Rodriguez (suspended for 2014 season): Management let out a huge sigh of relief when his suspension was upheld. While the team still owes A-Rod nearly $61 million, not having to worry about the circus he attracts is all the Yankees could have asked for at this point.

Future
- Bullpen/Rotation - Losing the greatest reliever of all time in Mariano Rivera will certainly sting, and it remains to be seen if David Robertson is ready for the challenge. Major question marks surround the starting rotation as well. CC Sabathia is looking to rebound following a forgettable season, Hiroki Kuroda is back after imploding late last year, and the fifth spot is up for grabs with Michael Pineda possibly being a dark horse after not pitching since 2011.
- Outfield/Infield - The outfield is very crowded now with the acquisitions of Ellsbury and Beltran. Between Ichiro and Brett Gardner one of them might have to go; Gardner would certainly attract better pieces at this point in their respective careers. It's definitely going to tough to replace the production they've gotten out of the second and third base positions over the last few years, but Brian Roberts and Kelly Johnson were two cheap, solid signings for the Yanks.

Read more »

The Weekly Rant: Possible Outcomes of the Tanaka Deal

Masahiro Tanaka's contract with the Yankees has gotten a lot of attention already.  Dave Cameron at Fangraphs had a nice overview of it.  I wanted to look more in depth at the specific possible outcomes for the deal.

The contract is interesting for reasons besides being one of the largest ever for a pitcher, at 7 years, $155 MM. (There's some disagreement on how to rank the pitcher mega-deals. MLBTR's Tim Dierkes has a great read on how they should be analyzed.) The contract also includes a $20 MM "release fee" and an "opt-out" after four seasons. Here's how the contract breaks down cost-wise with and without the "opt-out":

Years Cost Cost/Year w/ opt-out 4        $108 MM $27 MM w/o opt-out 7        $175 MM $25 MM

It's a ton of money either way.  The Yankees are going to be seriously hoping Tanaka opts-out though. The reason is that it is nearly impossible to imagine a situation where Tanaka both a) does not pitch well in his first four seasons and does not exercise the opt-out and b) pitches well enough in years 5-7 to be worth $67 MM.

Even if salary inflation bumps the value of 1 WAR over $9 MM by 2020 (Year 7), Tanaka would need to put up 2.5 WAR per season over years 5-7.  If he's likely to produce at that level, he will have just opt-out.  Overall, this deal would be pretty terrible if for the Yankees if Tanaka doesn't opt out.

Let's say he averages 2 WAR per year over the entire 7 seasons.  Maybe a little above 2 WAR for his 4 younger seasons and a little below for his 3 older seasons.  That's not great production, and not what the Yankees are expecting, but it's also not a complete bust. And let's assume some significant salary inflation, so that the overall $/WAR rate over the contract's duration is $8 MM/WAR. Here's how the contract would look:

Total	Total	Total	Surplus	$/WAR
WAR	Value	Cost	Value
14	$104 MM	$175 MM	­-$71 MM	$12.5MM

I guess that wouldn't crippling (for the Yankees), but its pretty bad.  Now lets see what would happen if Tanaka is a 3 WAR pitcher through his 4 seasons.  He would likely opt-out if this is the case.  If the going $/WAR rate is at just say $7 MM, he should be able to find a deal with more years and similar average annual value to what amounts to a 3-year, $67 MM option.  He would be entering his age-29 season at that point, so he'd be in line for a nice payday if healthy.  So I think as long as he's about 3 WAR pitcher through year 4, he'll opt-out. Now let's say $7 MM is the market rate over those four years and see what the contract looks like:

Total	Total	Total	Surplus	$/WAR
WAR	Value	Cost	Value
12	$84 MM	$108 MM	-$24 MM	$9 MM

Now it looks at least reasonable.  Since the "release fee" is getting spread around 4 years as opposed to 7, the average annual value goes up a couple million.  And remember this is guessing that Tanaka is about about as good as Hiroki Kuroda.  That would be a pretty nice projection for Tanaka, and he still doesn't provide positive return on that contract.  What does he have to pitch like for this deal to break even?

Total	Total	Total	Surplus	$/WAR
WAR	Value	Cost	Value
16	$112 MM	$108 MM	$4 MM	$6.75 MM

Basically, assuming some inflation, the Yankees are betting on Tanaka being a 4 WAR pitcher. He doesn't have to pitch like Yu Darvish to make this work, but he does have to very good.  And if he's only pretty good, the deal doesn't look good at all. And if he's not that good, this deal will be a 7-year disaster.  Tanaka is set-up exceptionally well to optimize his earnings no matter how he pitches.  But the Yankees are taking a big risk, knowing that Tanaka will have to pitch like an ace for this deal to be a winner.  

Blogger Roundtable: The Yankees' $189MM Question

The New York Yankees enter unchartered territory for a team used to two things: winning and spending money.  The front office has stated its desire to reduce spending next season to below the Competitive Balance Tax (CBT) threshold of $189MM.  Doing so would not only alleviate the 50% tax on spending over the limit this season, but would reduce the rate to 17% in the next season they choose to spend big. 

But it will not be easy.  The team spent over $203MM last season and failed to make the playoffs for the second time in decades.  The team has some big holes to fill, along with a number of free agents who would demand big money to stay around.  And though internally the Yankees may wish to cut payroll, their fan base's expectations of October baseball are doubtful to change. Even GM Brian Cashman noted that $189MM "is a goal, not a mandate."

A possible attempt to slash CBT relevant spending appears to have failed in Derek Jeter's new $12MM contract.  It was thought that though it is an increase over the Captain's player option, that it would save on average annual value.  But though some complicated rules in the Collective Bargaining Agreement, the deal will cost the Yankees more in both real dollars as well as those which count for CBT purposes.

But there are reasons to be optimistic. With many expensive players coming off the books, the Bombers will have some room to work with.  If Alex Rodriguez misses all or most of next season due to suspension, upwards of $25MM could be saved.  Additionally, key target Masahiro Tanaka will be expensive, but his massive posting fee will not hurt the Yankees attempt to slide under $189MM.  It will take some creativity and maybe some restraint, but it's entirely possible the club makes its stated goal.

So here's the question for our esteemed panel:

Will the Yankees spend less than the $189MM competitive balance tax threshold in 2014?

Jesse Sherman (Director of Operations, SBS)- No

The 2013 Yankees payroll was well over $200MM- and I don't see it decreasing drastically below the threshold. The Yankees have three players making over $23MM for 2014 (Rodriguez, Teixeira, and Sabathia), and that's not including Robinson Cano who will command the highest salary on the team (unless the sides can agree to a back-loaded contract). The aged Jeter just received a pay increase, and the Yankees will have to bolster their pitching staff by spending some money this offseason. But with over 98MM already being committed to just 7 players, the only chance they have of getting below the threshold is by not resigning Cano or Granderson. But even removing Granderson's contract and finding a steady replacement won't do the trick.

Adam Kirsch (Co-president, SBS)- No

I don't think the Yankees will make it under the tax threshold next year.  A great deal depends on how they choose to address key free agents – most notably Robinson Cano's call for a monster contract. A few arbitration-eligible players, such as Brett Gardner and David Robertson, will also likely cut into the Yankees' thrifty efforts. After missing the playoffs this year, I think that Cashman and Co. will not be afraid to spend to keep their key pieces in the Bronx.  
 

Kevin Cole (Featured Blogger)- Yes

 

It seems like the Yankees are fairly determined to get under the $189MM number. The club's behavior over the last couple of seasons would be hard to explain should they abandon this attempt to get under the Competitive Balance Tax Threshold, and it does seem like they are poised to meet their goal of lowering payroll to this level. The Yanks have a lot of cash coming off of the books this offseason from the likes of Mariano Rivera, Andy Pettitte, Kevin Youkillis, and others. Salary write-ups that I've seen give the Yanks around $70 million to play with this off-season in filling about 18 big league roster spots.

 

The Yanks obviously plan on giving a large portion of that amount to Robinson Cano. But, they could have an extra $27MM to play with, should A-Rod's suspension be upheld. If that happens, A-Rod's spot will need to be filled for 2014, but the team will have some additional freedom in making some free agent signings. Some are speculating that the Yanks are poised for a nice spending spree this off season, possibly for the likes of Masahiro Tanaka, Brian McCann, Carlos Beltran, and others. We'll see about that, but I believe the team is set to meet the $189MM goal, resign Cano, and perhaps one or two other high profile free agents. Whether or not they field a playoff contender, though, remains to be scene.

 

John Zakour (Featured Blogger)- No

 

I don't believe the Yankees will spend less than $189MM, but I believe it will be close. The fact the Yankees are serious about Cano and Tanaka means they likely won't let a few mil stop them (who would?). There situation is fluid, and may even change depending on A-Rod's punishment. But the fact we're talking about this is noteworthy. It indicates a paradigm shift, and shows the Yankees might actually be (somewhat) responsible with their contracts. The title of the freest spenders in baseball rests safely with the Dodgers.
 

Matthew Hakimian (Featured Blogger)- No

 

Not a chance the Yankees have a payroll under $189 million heading into the 2014 season. Although the team was marred by an obscene amount of injuries throughout the course of the year, GM Brian Cashman will ultimately get his way. Not only does the team desperately need to resign Robinson Cano, but it also has no idea what the future of A-Rod holds. Look for the Bombers to be in the market for the likes of Brian McCann and Japanese product Masahiro Tanaka. Don't we all remember what took place after the Yanks missed the playoffs in '08?

Adam Malz (Featured Blogger)- No

While the Yankees front office has repeatedly stated that their objective is to reduce their payroll to $189 million, I believe they will end up going over that by the end of this offseason. The Yankees are set to embark on an offseason similar to that of 08-09 when they spent $423 million on CC Sabathia, Mark Teixeira, and A.J. Burnett. This year their targets include Robinson Cano, Carlos Beltran, Brain McCann, and Masahiro Tanaka. They will most likely end up spending over $300 million in contracts to the players that they ultimately sign. After this, it will be a huge financial challenge to get below the $189 million competitive balance tax threshold.
 

Grading the Yankees' Front Office

 

We’ve been reminded continually of what a great job Yankee management has done this season to navigate through the injuries and declining production of an aging team. The story is going something like this:

"For the first time in seemingly forever, the mighty Yankees, victims of a series of unlucky injuries, were underdogs who hung around until late in September- just narrowly missing the playoffs. Cashman and Co. pushed the right buttons, dumpster dove for the right free agents, but fell just a little bit short. And hey, despite no playoffs, the results weren’t too bad; the ‘end of an era’ feeling was prevalent in the Bronx, anyways, so we weren’t expecting too much. Mariano Rivera’s summer-long retirement tour was a successful tribute to one of the classier athletes of our time, and the squad almost battled its way into to a storybook playoff run. Great in-season planning and decision making by the front office led the club to a respectable finish."

I'm not so sure I'm on board with that train of thought. As a lifelong fan, I closely watched the product the Yankees were rolling out this season, and I’m just not ready to buy that narrative. The Yankees surprised a lot of people with the way they hung around, and the brass is getting a lot of credit for the way they filled holes and planned for this season.

But how well did they really do?

I took a look at Yankee position player production this year by position using WAR and wRC+. Here's the breakdown as a win-loss record for management:

(All stats are from Fangraphs as of 9/25/13. For those who are unfamiliar with sabermetric stats, check the links to WAR and wRC+ for quick explanations)

CATCHER

Situation: No offer is made to resign Russell Martin, Pirates nab him for the reasonable price of 2 years, $17M (Yanks paid Martin $7.5M in 2012). Glaring hole ensues. 

Action: None. Career back-up Francisco Cervelli is left to assume catching duties.

Outcome: Cervelli is injured in late April after 61 PA. Chris Stewart and Austin Romine are only remaining options, and the numbers aren't pretty.

CATCHER	G	PA	HR	R	RBI	SB	WAR	wRC+
Chris Stewart	107	332	4	27	25	4	0.5	58
Austin Romine	60	148	1	15	10	1	-0.2	47
Francisco Cervelli	17	61	3	12	8	0	0.7	143
TOTAL	184	541	8	54	43	5	1	65

A full season's worth of plate appearances and an offensive output that is 35% below league average. Meanwhile, Martin has an excellent season for the Pirates, amassing a WAR of 4.0, and 101 wRC+. The numbers here speak for themselves. The Yanks had nothing in reserve after the injury to Cervelli, and they paid for it. No moves were made in-season to address this hole. Record: 0-1

FIRST BASE

Situation: With established 1B, Mark Teixeira, under contract, no action to be taken here originally. However, a March injury to Teixeira requires a replacement signing.

Action: Lyle Overbay is added to take over while Teixeira recovers.

Outcome: After a brief return, Teixeira re-injures his wrist, and is lost for the season. Overbay racks up 478 PAs.

FIRSTBASE	G	PA	HR	R	RBI	SB	WAR	wRC+
Lyle Overbay	138	478	14	43	58	1	0	87

With trade options, like Justin Morneau, available throughout the year, and no moves made to address this weakness until the signing of Mark Reynolds in mid-August, this is another loss for management. Replacement level WAR and below league-average offensive output from your first basemen is miserable. Also, the fact that Teixeira's injury cost him the season was not a complete surprise either. Injury experts like Will Carroll noted its severity early on. Moves could've been made. Record: 0-2

SECOND BASE

Situation: Robinson Cano resides here. No action necessary.

Outcome: Cano produces as expected.

SECONDBASE	G	PA	HR	R	RBI	SB	WAR	wRC+
Robinson Cano	156	665	27	80	105	7	6	142

No move was made here so we'll call it a push. This could register as a huge loss next year if the Yanks are unable to resign Cano at a reasonable price. But that's not part of this exercise.

Record: 0-2-1

SHORT STOP & THIRD BASE

Situation: Derek Jeter and Alex Rodriguez are injured to start the year, but the belief is that they will return before too long.

Action: Kevin Youkillis is signed to fill in at 3B, while back ups Jayson Nix and Eduardo Nunez are set to man short. 

Outcome: Disaster. Jeter, at 37, is never healthy in '13. Youkillis, predictably is injured well before A-Rod is ready to return. Nix, as a result, sees more PAs at 3B than any Yankee, while Nunez plays short. Neither of them stay healthy for long, either. In all, 8 players, besides A-Rod, slot in at third for at least 1 inning in '13, the majority of them minor leaguers or cast-offs. Here's the bulk of the production from the left side of the infield:

THIRD&SHORT	G	PA	HR	R	RBI	SB	WAR	wRC+
Alex Rodriguez	43	178	7	21	19	4	0.6	117
Derek Jeter	17	73	1	8	7	0	-0.6	48
TOTAL	60	251	8	29	26	4	0	97
Eduardo Nunez	85	312	2	33	25	10	-1.6	79
Kevin Youkilis	28	118	2	12	8	0	-0.4	78
Jayson Nix	87	303	3	32	24	13	0.7	70
TOTAL	200	733	7	77	57	23	-1.3	75

Nothing good to see here. Record: 0-4-1

OUTFIELD & DESIGNATED HITTER

Situation: Granderson returns. Nick Swisher does not and Ichiro is set to man right. Brett Gardner is slated to play Center. DH will be used to rest old-legs and hopefully avoid injuries.

Action: Granderson is the victim of a broken hand, and Vernon Wells is the answer. Travis Hafner is signed to DH, while Ben Francisco and Brennan Boesch are also signed as OF options. 

Outcome: Despite a rough '12 season, the Yanks opted to give Gardner a starting job in 2013, and were rewarded. This was a very good, albeit fairly obvious decision. The Yanks decided that Nick Swisher's production and contract demands were out of alignment and this was probably a good call, even though he clearly would've been useful with a 2.3 WAR and a 114 wRC+. I'll be generous and call this a push as they didn't lock down another bad contract to a declining player.  Here's the majority of the Bomber's OF and DH production this year: 

LEFTFIELD&DH	G	PA	HR	R	RBI	SB	WAR	wRC+
Curtis Granderson	56	222	7	31	14	7	1.6	102
Vernon Wells	127	447	11	45	50	7	-0.3	73
Travis Hafner	81	293	12	31	37	2	-0.4	87
Ben Francisco	21	50	1	4	1	0	-0.5	13
Brennan Boesch	23	53	3	6	8	0	-0.2	124
TOTAL	252	843	27	86	96	9	-1.4	77
CENTERFIELD	G	PA	HR	R	RBI	SB	WAR	wRC+
Brett Gardner	145	609	8	81	52	24	3.2	108
RIGHTFIELD	G	PA	HR	R	RBI	SB	WAR	wRC+
Ichiro Suzuki	147	546	7	56	35	20	1.1	71

Granderson's injuries were unlucky. But those things happen and the Yanks did not even come close to pulling the right strings to solve the issue. Significantly below average offensive production and a negative WAR from two offense-heavy positions in DH and LF equals 2 more losses for management. Centerfield is an easy win though. Factoring in aforementioned reasons, plus the fact that Ichiro at least offered some degree of production through strong defense (despite his inability to hit), we'll call right field a push. Record: 1-6-2

TRADE DEADLINE

Ok, so I've been pretty critical thus far. And, yes I ignored Alfonso Soriano when I assessed the outfield. For the Soriano trade and the Mark Reynolds pick up I will give the Yanks a full win, despite the fact that they only combined for half a season's worth of plate appearances:

ON THE FLY PICK-UPS	G	PA	HR	R	RBI	SB	WAR	wRC+
Alfonso Soriano	54	228	17	36	50	8	1.7	134
Mark Reynolds	31	106	5	13	17	0	0.6	10

Soriano was on fire from the minute they got him. Record: 2-6-2

MINOR LEAGUE CALL-UPS

This is the last category that I want to assess. As of September 25th, the Yanks had gotten 286 plate appearances from players plucked out of the minors (players like Ben Francisco, who were signed to minor league deals, are ignored for this section). Here are their numbers:

MINOR CALL-UPS	G	PA	HR	R	RBI	SB	WAR	wRC+
David Adams	41	142	2	10	11	0	-0.2	43
Zoilo Almonte	30	96	1	8	9	3	0.2	74
Melky Mesa	5	14	0	2	1	0	0.3	168
J.R. Murphy	13	14	0	3	0	0	-0.2	-1
Thomas Neal	4	13	0	1	0	0	-0.1	46
Corban Joseph	2	7	0	1	0	0	0	71
TOTAL	95	286	3	25	21	3	0	58

Not much there to write home about. Because these guys are minor leaguers, who aren't necessarily expected to produce at the major league level upon their first promotion, I won't give the front office a loss here. But it definitely doesn't show the Yankees farm system in a flattering light.
Final Record: 2-6-3

CONCLUSION

A generous 2-6-3 record for how the Yankee's handled each of their offensive positions and the trade deadline. Obviously my rating system wasn't exactly scientific, but the statistics are. In conclusion, the perception that the Yankees fell victim to bad luck is false. Injuries are unavoidable much of the time. Thus, planning for injuries is a necessity. So, I would argue that the blame for said "bad luck" actually falls in the lap of the Yankee's brass. As the only MLB team with an above .500 record, despite a negative run differential, the Yankees were actually very fortunate this season to achieve the record that they did. With that good fortune in winning a lot of close games, the argument can certainly be made that better acquisitions and planning could've led to a playoff berth.