Can NBA Teams Win a Championship with a Maximum Contract Player?

NBA free agency is already in full effect and everyone is making their prediction about where LeBron James will end up. Beyond LeBron, there are a few other high profile free agents and a number of teams with enough cap space to make a big splash in free agency. The surplus of teams with cap room is going to create bidding wars between these teams and ultimately the players will earn a big payday. While securing elite talent is necessary to building a competitive team, overpaying for talent and signing players to maximum contracts makes it near impossible to create a championship team under the current collective bargaining agreement.

One goal of the collective bargaining agreement signed by both the owners and the NBA players' union in 2011 was to create a competitive balance between all teams regardless of salary figures. Under the new CBA, teams who spend more than the "soft" salary cap are hit with a more severe luxury tax and lose options which offer salary flexibility. This has caused teams to reign in their spending and think twice before offering big long-term deals to players. Still, there are 19 players in the NBA today signed to a maximum contract, and 12 of those players were named NBA all-stars in 2014. Only seven of those players failed to lead their team to the playoffs last season.

While none of these max contracts are identical, as Larry Coon explains, these players occupy a substantial amount of their team's salary budget. This is the problem of max contracts under the current CBA. NBA championships are never won by one player, as it takes at least two usually three core players and solid role players rounding out the team. The Spurs won the championship this year with four key players. General managers cannot surround their max contract player with enough complimentary talent having such a restricted budget.  Only Kevin Durant and the 2012 Oklahoma City Thunder have made it to the NBA Finals with a max contract player during the three years the current CBA has been in effect, and they lost to the Miami Heat 4-1. To put that in perspective, only six teams made it to the NBA Finals without a max contract player from 1999, when the limit on an individual player's salary was created, to 2011. Of those six teams, only the 2004 Detroit Pistons and the 2011 Dallas Mavericks won the championship.

It was reported by Brian Windhorst that LeBron would be demanding a max contract from whichever team he ends up with (fun fact: LeBron James has never been the highest paid player on his respective team). In the current market, many other players will be offered a max contract. Kyrie Irving signed earlier in free agency, Carmelo Anthony will surely get a max deal, the Houston Rockets offered Chris Bosh a max contract to play in his hometown, and Gordon Hayward could even be offered a max deal.

What does this mean going forward? I would be shocked a team with a max contract player has not won the championship in the next two years before the players union can opt out of the bargaining agreement. While it has not been done yet none of the players who have tried make their teammates better the way LeBron James does. This is a guy who took a team that started Sasha Pavlovic and Daniel Gibson to an NBA Finals! Regardless of where LeBron goes it will be fun to see where not only the stars of this free agency class wind up, but also where the role players sign. The NBA landscape could be completely changed within the next few weeks.

The Weekly Rant: Qualifying Offer Trends

The qualifying offer has been talked about a lot lately.  Everyone has ideas on how to change the QO system so that it is more fair for players or teams or both.  While I think that there is plenty of room for improvement, I wanted to take a look at some data that incorporates the qualifying offer.

If you are nor familiar with the basics of the system, here's a good primer from MLBTR. So far, 23 players have received QO's, and 23 have rejected them. 10 players in 2012, and 13 players in 2013.  The chart below shows all of the the players, along with information related to the team that extended the QO:

Player	Year	Old Team	Payroll	Wins
Michael Bourn	2012	Braves	83.31	94
Nick Swisher	2012	Yankees	197.96	95
Adam Laroche	2012	Nationals	81.34	98
Rafael Soriano	2012	Yankees	197.96	95
BJ Upton	2012	Rays	64.17	90
Kyle Lohse	2012	Cardinal	110.30	88
Josh Hamilton	2012	Rangers	120.51	93
David Ortiz	2012	Red Sox	173.19	69
Hiroki Kuroda	2012	Yankees	197.96	95
Curtis Granderson	2013	Yankees	230.84	85
Robinson Cano	2013	Yankees	230.84	85
Ubaldo Jimenez	2013	Indians	80.26	92
Nelson Cruz	2013	Rangers	129.07	91
Shin-Soo Choo	2013	Reds	107.98	90
Mike Napoli	2013	Red Sox	151.15	97
Brain McCann	2013	Braves	92.25	96
Carlos Beltran	2013	Cardinals	117.69	97
Jacoby Ellsbury	2013	Red Sox	151.15	97
Hiroki Kuroda	2013	Yankees	230.84	85
Kendrys Morales	2013	Mariners	81.53	71
Ervin Santana	2013	Royals	84.07	86
Stephen Drew	2013	Red Sox	151.15	97
Averages			125.20	90.82

*Payroll Data from USA Today

As you can see, teams that extended qualifying offers were pretty well off financially and competitively. The average payroll of the teams for each of the free agents is over $125 MM (the Major League average team was spending around $105 MM per seasons during these years). The teams extending the QO averaged nearly 91 wins the previous season.

These numbers are a little higher than I would have thought.  We would expect good/higher-spending teams to have more players likely to receive large contracts than the rest of the league. But this data shows that bad/lower-spending teams have hardly participated in the process.  The only losing teams to make QO's are the under-performing 2012 Bobby V Red Sox (David Ortiz) and last year's Mariners (with the slightly anomalous Kendrys Morales).

Overall, better performing/higher-spending clubs are more likely to extend a qualifying offer, and are therefore more likely to receive benefits from the system.  These teams either receive draft pick compensation or increased leverage in retaining the player. If the qualifying offer was meant to benefit small market teams and competitive balance, there is no evidence that it does so.

Now let's look at the data on teams who have signed players under this system.  In this table, I have used the payroll and win amounts from the previous season for each team.  (For example, the Indians signed both Nick Swisher and Michael Bourn after each had turned down a qualifying offer following the 2012 season.  Therefore, the Indians' 2012 Payroll and Wins totals are listed.)

Player	Year	New Team	Payroll	Wins
Michael Bourn	2012	Indians	78.43	68
Nick Swisher	2012	Indians	78.43	68
**Adam Laroche	2012	Nationals	81.34	98
Rafael Soriano	2012	Nationals	81.34	98
BJ Upton	2012	Braves	83.31	94
Kyle Lohse	2012	Brewers	97.65	83
Josh Hamilton	2012	Angels	154.49	89
**David Ortiz	2012	Red Sox	173.19	69
**Hiroki Kuroda	2012	Yankees	197.96	95
Curtis Granderson	2013	Mets	75.40	74
Robinson Cano	2013	Mariners	81.53	71
Ubaldo Jimenez	2013	Orioles	99.83	85
Nelson Cruz	2013	Orioles	99.83	85
Shin-Soo Choo	2013	Rangers	129.07	91
**Mike Napoli	2013	Red Sox	151.15	97
Brain McCann	2013	Yankees	230.84	85
Carlos Beltran	2013	Yankees	230.84	85
Jacoby Ellsbury	2013	Yankees	230.84	85
**Hiroki Kuroda	2013	Yankees	230.84	85
*Kendrys Morales	2013	None
*Ervin Santana	2013	None
*Stephen Drew	2013	None
Averages			136.12	84.47

*Remains unsigned
**Re-signed with original team

From the chart, 5 players resigned with their former teams, while 3 players from this class remain unsigned.  But we still have some interesting numbers.  The average payroll of the teams signing these players was in fact higher than the teams that extended the offer.  However, these clubs had won 6 fewer games on average than the previously mentioned teams.  Overall, we still find that most of the teams who have participated in the the QO system are good/higher-spending.

Some have theorized that free agency hurts competitive balance, while previous studies have shown increased parity in the free agency era. This data does suggest that in the short term, premium free agents have moved from good teams to less good teams.  But in the long term, the flow of draft picks in the opposite direction could counteract or overwhelm the positive contributions of free agents. And again, it is mostly higher-performing, higher-spending teams that are involved in the first place.

It will be interesting to see how the qualifying offer will play out in future seasons.  There really isn't enough data to draw any solid conclusions.  But at the moment, it is hard to imagine the qualifying offer having any positive effect on competitive balance.  It seems that as  many commentators have stated, that the QO exists only as way to suppress free agent salaries.

The Weekly Rant: The Mixed Incentives of MLB's International Spending Limits

During the last CBA negotiations, MLB owners had to find areas in which they could restrain spending.  The league's ever-increasing revenues were directed not only into free agent salaries, but also into bonuses for amateur players from both North America and around the world.

While the Players Association resisted changes that would limit big league salaries (excepting the disastrous Qualifying Offer/Draft Pick Compensation scheme), they were certainly willing to budge on amateur spending.  Spending in the First-Year Player Draft (in which amateurs from the United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico participate) had increased dramatically as teams recognized the value in acquiring cost-controllable, young talent.

Similarly, amateurs from the rest of the world (mostly Latin America and Asia) saw their signing bonuses grow richer and richer in an unrestrained market place.  International amateurs could negotiate with any team, meaning they could receive more than equally talented U.S. players, who could only negotiate with the team that drafted them.

A "hard-slotting" system was agreed upon for the draft, which significantly limited what teams could spend on each pick (and the draft as a whole).  The new rules were a significant achievement for Major League Baseball, in that the spending pattern was not only stunted, but reversed.  Harsh penalties, including loss of future high-round draft picks as well as 100% taxes on overspending, have been effective as disincentives; draft spending decreased by over 11% the year after the new rules went into effect.

The clubs weren't as successful in crafting a new policy for international spending.  Many felt that an international draft would be the next logical step to contain spending and also to allocate talent more equitably across the league.  But a laundry list of possible difficulties caused the two sides to table the idea until after the CBA was negotiated*.

*In fact, an international draft may be a long ways off.  Sources I've talked to have said that neither side is really that unhappy with the current arrangement, and it may be more trouble than it's worth to implement a full international draft.

Instead, teams have "bonus pools" for international spending, just as they do in the draft. Players are still free to negotiate with all 30 teams, but some teams have more bonus pool money available (the amounts are determined using reverse-order standings of the previous season). In theory, this system should work just as effectively as hard-slotting in the draft.  But in reality, spending did not decrease, and may actually increase in coming seasons.

Unlike in the draft, the penalties for overspending are just not harsh enough in the international market.  Teams do face escalating taxes on overspending, along with reductions on spending during the next year.  But these disincentives did not deter the Cubs or Rangers from spending millions more than their allotted bonus poll during the most recent signing period.

While those two teams spent more than $8 MM each, the Yankees are prepared to make a mockery of the system.  Some reports estimate the New York club will spend upwards of $18 MM on prospects, which would result in over $12 MM in penalties.  They would be very restricted in the next season's international class, but there is just too much incentive to break the rules.

The return on investment for amateur talent by all lines of thinking is really quite high. Landing just one star player can result in tens of millions of surplus value during pre-arbitration and arbitration seasons. And while money isn't everything in scouting and signing top prospects, it certainly helps.  Some teams obviously feel that there is more to be gained by spending a great deal in one season to land a bunch of top prospects (and basically sitting it out the next year), than by signing one or two highly touted players each July 2.

This will be a perfect storm once the Yankees really get involved.  First, there are the diminishing marginal costs (once you go over by a little bit, it makes sense to go over by a lot).  Then you have a team that has seen its spending in other areas slowed by tougher penalties. The competitive balance tax curtails the free agent market. Hard-slotting restricts draft spending.  The Yankees are severely limited on ways they can spend money efficiently.

Additionally, the Yankees have struggled to add impact talent through the draft (as a result of both their later draft positions and general under-performance in scouting, signing, and developing talent).  It's easy to see why they are prepared to go crazy on this coming year's crop of international amateurs.

Obviously this isn't what Bud Selig envisioned when the new system was drawn up; big market teams like the Cubs, Rangers, and Yankees buying up the top rated prospects from around the world while small market teams fight for the scraps.  One way to change this would be through the previously discussed international draft.

In absence of that possibility, harsher restrictions are needed.  More severe taxes would be the easiest and least intrusive penalty to implement. I would favor more severe and effective disincentives, such as the loss of draft picks for anything worse than minor overspending.  That penalty has worked thus far for hard-slotting, and I think it could be employed similarly in the international market.


Feature Image courtesy of MLB.com.

The Weekly Rant: A-Rod and Arbitrators

 

 

We learned late last week that Alex Rodriguez's suspension had been cut to 162 games. Commissioner Bud Selig had originally banned the former star for 211 games, but arbitrator Frederic Horowitz decided on a reduced sentence, although not as reduced as A-Rod and his team would have liked. The decision generated a great deal of buzz because Rodriguez is still baseball's most famous active player, and because many people are interested in the Yankees. 

 

Critics of Major League Baseball immediately pointed out how much more severe this punishment was than suspensions for other players who violated the Joint Drug Agreement, including those who attempted to mislead investigators.  The JDA levies penalties of 50 games for a first-time, 100 games for a second-time, and a lifetime ban for a third-time violation. Ryan Braun accepted a 65-game ban after repeatedly lying about and concealing his use of PED's. Besides Braun, all violators had received penalties in accordance with the JDA.

 

But baseball obviously decided that A-Rod's actions constituted more than just using banned substances.  Selig used his powers as commissioner to dole out punishments for actions detrimental to the good of baseball.  While this power has traditionally been used for lifetime bans, MLB officials saw no reason it couldn't be used for lesser suspensions as well. The MLBPA filed a grievance on Rodriguez's behalf, and he went to an arbitration hearing armed with his private legal team, after pushing away his own union.

 

Much of the writing about baseball out there is done by, you know, baseball writers.  But there are some people who weigh in on baseball's legal and economic aspects that know what they are talking about.  Wendy Thurm at Fangraphs is one of these people. Thurm's well-researched and well-written pieces are truly must-reads.  That's why I was a little disappointed in her last post, Arbitrator’s Decision On Rodriguez Suspension Leaves Bad Taste.

 

The writing had an almost accusatory tone to it.  While it was factually correct, Thurm didn't really clarify who she was criticizing for the decision.  Her biggest criticism concerned the lack of precedent for the length of the suspension, and the specific violations A-Rod was being punished for. Since the JDA only accounts for 50 games (or possibly 100 if MLB successfully argued multiple violations), then the suspension must also have considered additional language in the CBA. And to go from 65 games (Braun) to 162 games (Rodriguez) is quite a big gap. So while I agree with Thurm that the arbitrator's decision was kind of dramatic and somewhat surprising, I still have faith that Horowitz made a good decision.

 

Horowitz had access to evidence and testimony that we may never see or hear, and ruled that most of the suspension would remain intact.  To argue that his decision leaves a bad taste would imply that he is either incompetent or lacked impartiality.  I don't think it would be fair to say he was incompetent, especially since he had more information than us.  To say that he was not impartial would ignore the realities of arbitration.  Arbitrators must be impartial or else they do not get hired again. 

 

The one possible critique of baseball arbitrators that may have some credence is a tendency to split the decisions between labor and management.  While I have never seen data to support this theory, anecdotally it could be true that after a big win for the employees (the case where the drug tester improperly handled Braun's urine sample), then arbitrators may lean more towards employers in the next decision. 

 

But if we assume Horowitz is impartial, than who could be blamed for the bad taste of the decision?  If the MLBPA was heading A-Rod's case, then it may have been plausible that they didn't deliver a just defense.  But it was Rodriguez's lawyers that defended him, so I assume they were putting in a good effort.

 

Could Selig and MLB be at fault for the bad taste of this decision? They of course went all out to make this suspension stick, and they must have done a pretty good job. If they did anything in poor taste, it would have been up to A-Rod's lawyers to exploit it, and up to the arbitrator to ultimately decide. 

 

I guess I just have more faith in binding arbitration than Thurm does. In all fairness, her writing may have been just pointing out that it's not good to have your most famous player suspended for a whole season.  Nor is it good for the next potential commissioner (Rob Manfred) to be paying drug dealers for evidence against a player.  Nor is it good that we are still talking about performance enhancing drugs so many years into the "new" Joint Drug Agreement.  I think all of those statements are more fair than criticizing an arbitration decision. 

 

Most people agree that Rodriguez will not be able to win a favorable decision in federal courts.  He may receive an injunction if there is a sympathetic judge out there.  But that will just allow him to be a side show for a little longer.  Much like Bonds, Rodriguez has been turned into a great villain.  Whether you think he did it all to himself, or if you think baseball, the union, or even an arbitrator were out to get him, it's a very sad baseball story. Thurm was certainly right that something leaves a bad taste. 

 

 

 

NBA Salary Cap Part I: The Problem

This is Part I in a two-part series.  To read the conclusion, click here.

After amnestying former math major Metta World Peace, the only contract on the Lakers books for 2015 is Steve Nash. In today's NBA, cap space is sacred. GM's wheel and deal, trying to clear their books so they can offer another max contract.

To contend it used to be an NBA franchise had to get bad enough to get in the lottery, get lucky enough to win it, draft carefully for years, and develop their players. The San Antonio Spurs, Thunder, and recently the Indiana Pacers, are examples of this philosophy. But the Heat, Knicks, Lakers, Rockets, and KG era Celtics are examples of a new way to rebuild- to varying degrees of success. It used to be the best franchise were card counters, playing the odds to the best they can. Now it’s just about buying out the best hands.

Draft picks are no longer the most sacred asset for building a contender. There's been a paradigm shift. Now draft picks are levied to get precious cap space. The Knicks give away draft picks like candy. Yet the team has gone from a bottom feeder to top two in the East, while only hitting on one pick in the process- Iman Shumpert. The Rockets look to be in the middle of a similar situation, if you swap Carmelo Anthony for Dwight Howard and Shumpert for Chandler Parsons. Although the jury is still out on their latest picks, the least important vertex of the drafting-free agency-trading triangle has undoubtedly been drafting.

This is unfathomable in any other sport (except maybe for the Yankees). The same goes for the two time defending champion Heat. Although Dwayne Wade was home grown, LeBron James, Chris Bosh, and Ray Allen, were all free agent signings or sign and trades. The Heat's most important draft pick among building this dynasty (besides the ones they traded away) was Norris Cole. The Rockets will have two players making max money on their books who were both drafted and developed by smaller market teams.

Could This Ever Happen?

Now the Lakers are taking a similar gamble. They believe there is a chance they could sign Lebron, Melo, or both and are willing to sacrifice the entirety of the 2014 season to do so. Whether they have a chance at either is a topic for another column (spoiler alert: no).

The Nets are going for it. So much, in fact their salary commitments for next year exceeds $100 million, in a league where the cap is set under $60 million. Brooklyn won't be under the cap until the 2016-17 season, and it will be interesting to watch how newly acquired Paul Pierce and Kevin Garnett gel. Their owner is crazy rich, and teams like San Antonio, OKC, Indiana just can't go that deep into the luxury tax, as Brooklyn will be paying over 70 million dollars in luxury tax alone. The Nets total payroll obligations could touch $180 million. A team will be paying one hundred and eighty million dollars in a league where the cap is a third of that.

Although the goal of the new CBA was supposedly to help the balance of the NBA and prevent the big market teams from buying the best players, it seems to have done the opposite. It is certainly not impossible for small markets to win (as the Spurs just demonstrated), but their margin of error is a lot smaller. Even if a major market team has been plagued by bad drafting,it is easier for them to contend then their small market counter parts.

The result is major market teams are at a huge advantage. More troubling, small market teams are not keeping their home grown super stars. The luxury tax penalties are steep, but not steep enough to deter big markets for dipping into the tax to get another max guy. It's like an electric fence that hurts small market teams disproportionally when they try to run through it. 

The max contract is hurting the NBA. Or not. Ratings are up, and one of the best finals ever was played. The NBA has a real villain in the Miami Heat. Does David Stern or Adam Silver really want to change a winning formula?

This is Part I in a two-part series.  To read the conclusion, click here.

The Impact of the Long-Term Contract in Major League Baseball

Buster Posey didn't need free agency to land his big deal.

With the recent contract extensions awarded to Tigers’ ace Justin Verlander ($180M/7 yrs) and Giants’ MVP Buster Posey ($167M/9 yrs), it’s hard to ignore what has become a powerful trend in Major League Baseball. Teams are locking up their young talent as we rapidly approach what Grantland’s Jonah Keri calls “the death of free agency.” The list of homegrown stars that have recently signed long-term extensions with their clubs is vast, highlighted by names such as Joey Votto, Felix Hernandez, and Evan Longoria.

Changes to the recent CBA, coupled with a new TV contract for MLB, have fueled this trend on both the supply and demand sides of baseball’s labor market. New luxury tax incentives to reduce payroll, as well as a revamped free agent compensation system that raises the implicit costs of signing a player, have created new risks for players entering free agency Rather than test this tenuous market, players are wise to ink lucrative deals as soon as they become available. Further, small-market teams, anticipating their equal share in MLB’s forthcoming massive TV contract with FOX and Turner Sports, are more willing than ever to pay a hefty price to keep their young talent.

So the stage is set for an era of parity in baseball. It’s no coincidence that this upcoming season is so difficult to predict, as the times of buying one’s way to a championship is essentially over. Instead, teams will need to direct funds toward talent development within their systems if they wish to compete.

But will the effect on competitive balance truly be positive? The answer is yes, but a very qualified yes. See why after the jump.

In the short run, there is no doubt this trend will help improve on-field parity. Teams evidently no longer feel compelled to trade their stars prior to their entering free agency, and similarly, big market teams simply won’t be able to buy up talent on the free agent market. But in the long run, the answer is not so clear-cut. The ultimate irony of free agency is that it has incidentally served as a great equalizer between small and large market teams. And the pattern of securing young players early in their careers threatens the balancing function of free agency.

Because players are not eligible for free agency until they have amassed at least six years of service, players generally do not reach the open market until their late 20s. At this point, most them have reached or passed their primes, rendering long-term contracts to free agents generally unfavorable for teams, particularly at the tail end of a deal. When you think long-term free agent contract, it’s much easier to come up with a bad one (Alex Rodriguez, Vernon Wells, Alfonso Soriano) than a good one (I can’t think of any). Free agency, therefore, has offered an easy out for small-market teams. They can let their soon-to-be-aging-stars walk, while saving face to their fans by blaming the rich. Then, they can funnel the cash that they would have wasted years down the road toward retooling their farm systems. Now, however, small market teams will remain on the hook for their star players even once they have passed their primes. Undoubtedly, Buster Posey is an excellent player. But $18.5 million for a 35-year old catcher in 2022? Probably not ideal. The Giants, of course, are a relatively large-market team and can probably absorb that cost. If Posey can go on and consistently perform at the level he is clearly capable, and wins the Giants a few more World Series on the way, no one in San Francisco will complain. But consider the Joey Votto deal ($251.5m/12years), in which the small-market Reds will owe him $21 million in 2023, when he is 40 years old. Sounds like an impending disaster.

Small market teams are trying to beat the free agent system that has stolen their talent since its inception. But this process has largely been a blessing in disguise, and these teams are now killing the very game that has allowed them to compete in recent years.

Playoff Restructuring in Major League Baseball: Changing the Course of History?

MLB fans may be robbed of thrilling moments in the future

Some people consider Wednesday, September 28th, 2011 as the most thrilling day in MLB regular season history. In a matter of minutes, the Atlanta Braves missed the playoffs by completing a 10.5 game collapse that persisted throughout September; the Boston Red Sox followed suit by blowing a ninth inning lead in a loss to the Baltimore Orioles; and Evan Longoria propelled the Tampa Bay Rays into the playoffs as the Wild Card winner with a dramatic extra inning walk-off homer against the Yankees. Under the new MLB CBA agreement, the games that Atlanta, Boston, and Tampa Bay played that night would have been meaningless.

Major League Baseball agreed to expand its playoffs to a ten team format, increasing from the three division winners and a wild card spot in each league to one extra wild card team in both the American and National League. The two Wild Card teams, which will be the two teams with the best records who did not win their division, will face off in a one game playoff after the regular season concludes to determine which team will advance to the next round.

Those who condemn the new system point to the fact that this change would have prevented MLB’s most historic regular season moments from occurring. If the new agreement had been in place last year, the Red Sox would have played the Rays in a one game playoff and Evan Longoria’s late-game heroics would have been for naught. The Braves would have played the Cardinals in the one game playoff and, if they had beaten St. Louis, the Cinderella story of playoff hero David Freese and the 2011 Cardinals would never have existed. Likewise, the 163rd game of the 2009 season that pitted the Tigers against the Twins in a battle for the AL Central crown would never have taken place. Not to mention the fact that this classic game which sent Minnesota to the division series was deemed by Sports Illustrated as MLB’s Best Regular-Season Game of the 2000s.

So with all of the history that could potentially be erased under the new CBA agreement, why has MLB ultimately decided to revamp its playoff system?

The most significant business incentive for Bud Selig to modify MLB’s playoff alignment is to bring the thrill of October baseball to two extra markets every year, whether it’s to a large market such as Philadelphia or to an organization that has never experienced playoff baseball, such as the Washington Nationals.

Of course, critics will point to the unfairness of the new format, as a 95 win team that doesn’t win its division can work all season long to ultimately be knocked off by an 85 win team in the always unpredictable one-game playoff.

Another valid argument is that the infrequency of a one game playoff to determine who plays in October is what makes that final game so exciting and draws larger television audiences. After all, the final games of the 2011 season increased MLB’s ratings across the board and the Detroit-Minnesota matchup in 2009 was the most watched game of that season, drawing 6.543 million viewers.

At the end of the day, baseball fans will always wait with anticipation for the one play that will end a team’s season or lift a player to immortality. Under the new CBA agreement, millions of fans can mark this sure-to-be thrilling one game playoff down in their calendars every single year and witness the next Evan Longoria or David Freese carry his team to the promised land.