Batting Leadoff: Is Making Offseason Headlines a Good Thing?

This post originally appeared on Batting Leadoff. Batting Leadoff is a website dedicated to providing readers with premium baseball content. Posts from the site will appear regularly on the Sports Business Society Blog (view the information in the sidebar for updated information.)

-By Alex Smith

As we enter the 2013 offseason, we’re going to hear a lot about the free agent activities of Robinson Cano, Jacoby Ellsbury, and Shin-Soo Choo, as well as possible trades involving David Price and Troy Tulowitzki. However, it’s likely that the signings and trades of other lesser-known players will have a bigger impact on the outcome of the 2014 season than the signings and possible trades of these superstars.

If you look at recent history, it’s the teams who have made shrewd value driven acquisitions rather than a lot of noise that have made the largest jumps in the standings on a year-to-year basis. If we compare the standings from 2012 to 2013, the Red Sox made the grandest jump in wins at 28, the Cleveland Indians made the second largest leap at 24, the Royals the third highest at 18, and the Pirates the fourth greatest leap at 15 wins.

In case you didn’t notice, the Toronto Blue Jays and the Los Angeles Angels, despite being last winter’s biggest headliners, failed to make this list. In fact, the Blue Jays only won 1 more game in 2013 than they did in 2012 and the Angels actually lost 11 more games. The Los Angeles Dodgers and Cincinnati Reds also made a lot of news around the blogosphere last winter, but the Dodgers broke the bank to make sure that spending was worth it and the Reds simply added an established outfielder in Choo to an already playoff-bound core.

So what does this all teach us? First, let’s analyze how the Red Sox, Indians, Royals, and Pirates made their jumps to the top of the standings. Red Sox fans were frustrated last offseason with the lack of a notable moves after getting rid of the contracts of Adrian Gonzalez, Josh Beckett, and Carl Crawford. However, they received fantastic value in the signings of Shane Victorino, Koji Uehara, and Mike Napoli. This value, combined with healthier seasons from Dustin Pedroia and Jacoby Ellsbury, the reemergence of Jon Lester and Clay Buchholz, and David Ortiz’s ability to fend off father time, led them to a championship.

The Indians made some headlines last winter by signing outfielders Nick Swisher and Michael Bourn, yet it wasn’t just these signings that led the Tribe to earn one of the wildcard births. Between them, they only posted a WAR of 4.4 in 2013, 1.8 WAR below Michael Bourn’s personal 2012 WAR. The Indians were successful because Jason Kipnis broke out, Yan Gomes and Ryan Raburn far exceeded expectations, and Justin Masterson, Ubaldo Jimenez, and Scott Kazmir all turned their careers around. In essence, rather than the noteworthy signings of Swisher and Bourn making the quintessential difference, it was the less noteworthy acquisitions of Kazmir, Gomes, and Raburn along with improvements from players they already had, that led Cleveland’s turnaround.

Of the four teams that made the biggest leaps in wins, the Royals are, in a way, the outlier. Their “big” trade last winter actually did pay off, at least in the context of 2013. By acquiring James Shields, the Royals were able to shore up what otherwise would have been a questionable pitching staff and win 90 games. The down-side to this, though, is the consequences that will come with the short-sightedness of the Shields trade.

Even though the Royals won 90 games, they gave up Wil Myers in the process. Myers could be a top five player in baseball in a few years and the Royals would have had six years of team control. Instead, they received two years of James Shields and they failed to make the postseason in year one. Yet, just stating that the Royals improvements can be attributed to Shields would be foolish. Like the Indians and Red Sox, the Royals also benefitted significantly from unheralded signings such as Ervin Santana and Jeremy Guthrie.

The Pittsburgh Pirates are the best example of how value-driven acquisitions can turn a franchise around. Without making too many national news outlets last year, the Pirates smartly picked up Russell Martin and Francisco Liriano via free agency and then traded for Marlon Byrd and Justin Morneau at mid-season to help fill holes in their lineup. It’s also important to note the chance Pittsburgh took on A.J. Burnett the year before that has paid off mightily. It is through these moves that the Pirates have been able to find effective supporting players for their home-grown superstars like NL MVP Andrew McCutchen and Pedro Alvarez.

Now that we’ve analyzed where it went right for the aforementioned four teams, let’s look at where it went wrong for the Blue Jays and Angels. The Blue Jays pitching staff was a wreck all year with no consistency behind Dickey and Buehrle, both of whom were only mediocre. Offensively, Reyes only played in 93 games and their lineup simply had too many holes around him. It’s hard to go anywhere when you only have two players in your lineup who played in more than 110 games and posted positive WARs.

The Los Angeles Angels were supposed to have one of the best lineups in baseball in 2013 after the addition of Josh Hamilton. All winter, fans were giddy about getting to see a top of the lineup featuring Mike Trout, Albert Pujols, Josh Hamilton, and Mark Trumbo. Yet, Pujols’ injury problems caused him to struggle until he eventually was forced to have season-ending surgery and Hamilton never lived up to expectations. However, the Angels would have needed both of these players to be absolutely spectacular if they were going to overcome their pitching deficiencies. The Angels had the fourth highest xFIP in the league and the 7th highest ERA, and only C.J. Wilson pitched more than 155 innings for the year.

After analyzing what went right and what went wrong in terms of 2012-13 offseason acquisitions, a major theme becomes clear: star players are nice and are good for building excitement going into a season, but filling holes is more important. These players, who can often be acquired cheaply and fly under the radar, serve as the glue for any team with the intentions of contending in the postseason.

The Oakland A’s, who built a team around such undervalued assets (they made their jump from 2011 to 2012 so it’s not chronicled in this article), are a perfect example of how having no holes can be more effective than trying to compensate for holes with star players. If you’re going to make a headline move, however, you must be adding to an existing core (see Cincinnati Reds) or you must be willing to spend like the current Los Angeles Dodgers or 2000s New York Yankees. If your team’s not doing this, they’re either selling out on their future to succeed (see Kansas City Royals) or only trying to sell tickets without caring about winning.

Knowing this trend, I encourage all fans to follow where players like Bronson Arroyo, Dan Haren, and David Murphy end up. Because while it will be fun seeing where Robinson Cano, Jacoby Ellsbury, Shin-Soo Choo, David Price, and Troy Tulowitzki land (and they will all definitely impact the 2014 season) it is the signings that go barely noticed that could be making the biggest difference next fall.

Alex Smith is a junior in the School of Industrial and Labor Relations at Cornell University. In addition to being the founder of Batting Leadoff, he works as a scout/field manager for Perfect Game USA and sits on the planning committee for the 2013 Ivy Sports Symposium. He is a relief pitcher on the Cornell varsity baseball team and hopes to one day pursue a career in baseball operations, player development, or amateur scouting. Contact him at aws77@cornell.edu or follow him on twitter @RealAlexSmith19.

This post originally appeared on Batting Leadoff. Batting Leadoff is a website dedicated to providing readers with premium baseball content. Posts from the site will appear regularly on the Sports Business Society Blog (view the information in the sidebar for updated information).

Sportvision and the Future of Sabermetrics

During the 1970s and 1980s, Bill James revolutionized baseball through his collection of Baseball Abstracts. His unique perspective of evaluating players and discovering their true impact on their team's chances of winning was the beginning of a movement that would shake the very foundation of the sport.

Since the last Baseball Abstract was published in 1988, baseball sabermetrics have only continued to become increasingly popular and crucial to the ways franchises construct their teams. They even developed a presence in pop culture through the release of the Michael Lewis’ best-selling novel, and the later Hollywood film, Moneyball.

As sabermetrics have proven, through the success of teams like the Oakland A’s, to be effective in terms of evaluating the value of players, the precise statistics used have continued to evolve. Over the last ten years, sabermetrics have moved from the days of Bill James’ Runs Created, Win Shares and Range Factor statistics to even more complex formulas with more specific aims.

For example, the original Runs Created statistic that was developed by James has now been superseded by Weighted Runs Created plus (wRC+), a new equation which compares a player's On Base Plus Slugging (OPS) against the league average and then accounts for ballpark factors and run-scoring environments.

While sabermetrics have continued to become increasingly refined and specific, all of these detailed new statistics still only evaluate results. These advanced statistics such as Wins Above Replacement (WAR), Expected Fielding Independent Pitching (xFIP) and Skill Interactive ERA (SIERA), as effective as they are, are results-based. They fail to answer the question of why these results occurred.

Introduce Sportvision, a company whose technologically advanced cameras have been placed in Major League Baseball stadiums since 2006. Most fans probably already know Sportvision from the K-Zone cameras featured prominently by TBS and Fox this postseason. While Sportvision cameras might be enhancing the fan experience, their real value lies in the data they collect for teams to analyze.

Sportvision has developed services called Pitch F/X and Hit F/X, which track and record data from every single Major League Baseball game. For example, Pitch F/X tracks the velocity, horizontal movement, vertical movement and location of each pitch thrown. This data allows teams to analyze which pitch was most effective for a given pitcher and why that pitch was effective. A team could also analyze the value of velocity compared to location or movement.

Hit F/X takes a similar approach in analyzing batters. Instead of focusing on the results of each at bat, Hit F/X tracks the contact point, speed of the ball off the bat, elevation angle and field direction of each batted ball.

Sportvision, recognizing the value of this data, has created SCOUTrax, which uses the data from Pitch F/X and Hit F/X, as well as a third creation of theirs, Command F/X, to create heat maps and charts to better display the data to fans.

This new technology has opened the door for an endless number of new ways to evaluate the effectiveness of players, as well as help teams develop their own players. 

For example, teams will be able to see the value in an added half inch of movement to a pitcher’s fastball compared to extra velocity. Or, the team will be able to see that, although a particular hitter might not have had the best statistical year, he actually hit the ball particularly hard a high percentage of the time and should have fared better.

As the Sportvision data continues to be analyzed further, look for the development of future sabermetrics that are completely process-driven. Websites such as www.fangraphs.com have already started developing these types of statistics using Pitch F/X, such as Pitch Type Linear Weights, which attempts to determine a pitcher’s run expectancy per a given type of pitch.

Yet, the data from Sportvision is still in its youthful stages and needs to be further refined. For example, cameras in certain stadiums may read pitcher’s velocity or movement slightly differently, thus altering the way the data matches up. This issue might only create minor variances, but it is essential that it be fixed in the near future so a totally uniform data set can be collected.

Despite these minor deficiencies, Sportvision still holds the potential to greatly affect the way coaches, player personnel directors and baseball operations professionals develop players as their careers progress. As sabermetrics continue to evolve and become more refined, expect the data collected from from Pitch F/X and Hit F/X to be a central focus and have a profound impact on the game.

A Statistical Dissection of the 2012 Oakland A’s: Billy Beane’s Finest Work

Billy Beane 

The Hollywood blockbuster, Moneyball, ended much like any other feel good film, as protagonist Scott Hatteberg belted a home run that sent the small market underdog Oakland A’s into the postseason. However, unlike most silver screen dramas, the story of the Oakland A’s did not end with a “happy ever after” attached at the end.

After using Billy Beane’s innovative scouting to build teams that posted above .500 records from 1999 to 2006, the A’s could not finish above that mark for the next 5 years. It seemed as though the rest of the league had caught on to the A’s strategy, and that Billy Beane had lost his touch. Using their economical advantage, combined with the sabermetric scouting originally developed by the A’s, other larger market teams seemed to once again hold a competitive advantage over Oakland.

At the onset of the 2012 baseball season, virtually all baseball fans could not imagine the Oakland A’s making much of an impact in an AL West division dominated by the superstar heavy Texas Rangers and Los Angeles of Anaheim. However, 2012 turned out to be Billy Beane’s most masterful work yet as the Oakland A’s finished 94-70, winning the division with a payroll of roughly $99 million less than Angels and $65 million less than the Rangers. So how did this happen? How did the A’s once again use undervalued talent to reach the postseason?

When opposing pitchers stared at the Oakland A’s lineup card during 2012 season, it is hard to imagine any of them shaking in fear. The A’s did not feature any hitter batting over .300 or who drove in over 85 runs, and only had three players finish with more than 20 home runs. However, the A’s use of platooning, a declining trend in Major League Baseball, to account for their deficiencies, led to the underrated effectiveness of their lineup.

At first base for example, Brandon Moss is the regular starter against right-handed pitching, while Chris Carter usually gets the start against left-handers. Moss put up stellar numbers against right handed pitching all season, hitting 19 home runs, while driving in 44 runs and slugging .643 in 207 at bats. Against lefties, Carter hit five home runs, drove in 17, while slugging .494 in 83 at bats. Another platoon employed by the A’s is at designated hitter with Johnny Gomes and Seth Smith. Smith homered 12 times while slugging .454 and having an OPS of .805 against right handers in 313 at bats. While Gomes hit 11 homers to go along with a .413 OBP and .974 OPS against left handers in 164 at bats. The A’s have also prominently used other platoons throughout the season, such as at the catcher spot with Derek Norris and George Kottaras.

While the A’s use of platooning did spark their offense, this success did not stand out in traditional statistical categories. With a batting average of .238 the A’s finished 28th in the league, leaving only two last-place teams, the Houston Astros and the Seattle Mariners, with lower marks. Even On Base Percentage, a statistic prominently featured in the original Moneyball, cannot account for their 2012 success, as their .310 OBP ranks 24th in the league.

However, what Oakland lacked in getting on base and batting average they made up for in the power game. The A’s finished 7th in the league in home runs and while their slugging percentage ranked 15th in the league, that ranking is considerably higher than expected given their lowly batting average. In the sabermetric community, Oakland’s hitters excelled, as well. The A’s ranked 10th in the league in Weighted Runs Created (wRC+), an improved version of Bill James’s original Runs Created statistic, which “attempts to quantify a player’s total value and measure it in runs.” Overall, despite a ridiculously low batting average and lack of star power, the A’s were able to produce the 14th most runs in Major League Baseball, which, with their surprisingly impressive pitching staff, proved to win a lot of ballgames.

Similar to the offense, the A’s pitching staff proved that big names are not a necessity for success. Unlike the hitters, however, more traditional metrics can be used to quantify the A’s pitching staff feats. In 2012 the A’s staff posted a 3.48 ERA, which was good for 6th best in the league to go along with 1.24 WHIP. The one anomaly was strikeouts, in which the A’s finished 26th in the league. This lack of strikeouts, however, was not truly an anomaly, but rather an indicator of a general pitching strategy employed by the A's.

The A’s finished 9th in the league in fewest walks allowed going along with having the 10th lowest walk percentage. The A’s also had the 7th highest percentage of fastballs thrown. These statistics show that A’s pitchers used the strategy of attacking the zone with fastballs and forcing contact in order to limit opposing batters. This strategy does not require having pitchers with dominant strikeout arsenals, a skill set generally more expensive to obtain.  While pitching to contact by attacking hitters with fastballs worked in 2012 for the A’s, advanced sabermetrics suggest that the success of the A’s pitchers might be somewhat attributable to luck. The A’s had the third lowest BABIP (Batting average on balls in play) in the league, the 7th highest xFIP (Expected fielding independent pitching), and the 8th highest SIERA (Skill interactive ERA). Having a low BABIP is a signal that many balls hit by opposing batters went directly to Oakland fielders. Going forward, this might not always be the case and more balls could fall in for hits. xFIP is a statistic that attempts to judge pitchers on entirely what they can control, using a combination of strikeouts, walks, hit by pitches, and “how many home runs they should have allowed” (using home run to fly ball ratios and multiplying it by fly ball rate), to try and determine how effective a pitcher is without the effect of his fielders. The higher the xFIP a team or pitcher has, the worse they were and the A’s xFIP of 4.2 is categorized as “below average” by Fangraphs.

The last sabermetric in which the A’s pitching staff failed to excel was SIERA. SIERA differs from xFIP because it places more emphasis on balls in play, using groundball and flyball rates, as well as walks and strikeouts to attempt to determine a pitchers skill. The A’s finished the year with a SIERA of 4.03, which was the 8th highest in all of baseball. So while the A’s did have one of the most effective staffs in the league according to traditional measures like ERA, advanced sabermetrics predict that the A’s success might soon run out or is unlikely to reoccur. In total, however, the A’s only allowed the 6th lowest amount of runs in the league in 2012, which along with their power and timely hitting led to winning 94 games.

The next question one must ask when dissecting the success of the 2012 Oakland A’s is, how did Billy Beane assemble this team? What changes were made from 2011 to 2012 that led to this significant increase in wins?

The only headlining acquisition was the signing of international free agent Yoenis Cespedes for a 4 year, 36 million dollar deal. Cespedes might have been an international superstar, but many in baseball circles thought that it would take some time for him to adjust to Major League pitching. Yet, the A’s Director of Baseball Operations Farhan Zaidi, felt he could be a key contributor and convinced Beane to make the investment. The 2012 season is proof that Zaini made the right judgment, as Cespedes hit .292 with 23 home runs and 82 RBI’s.

While the Cespedes deal made headlines, it was the more low key moves made by Beane that really boosted the A’s all season long. Similar to the 2002 season depicted in Moneyball, Beane was able to find value in players where other teams did not. In a deal with the Red Sox, Beane sent reliever Andrew Bailey and Ryan Sweeney to the Red Sox for inexperienced outfielder Josh Reddick and two minor leaguers. As stated earlier, Reddick exceeded everyone’s expectations by hitting 32 homers and slugging .463. Also, in a multiplayer deal with the Diamondbacks, Beane traded starter Trevor Cahill and veteran reliever Craig Breslow for rookie Jarrod Parker, reliever Ryan Cook, and Colin Cowgill. In 2012, Parker was arguably the best rookie pitcher in the American League posting 3.47 ERA in 181.1 innings, while Ryan Cook was an All-Star reliever in the set-up role with a 2.09 ERA and 42 holds.

The third trade which significantly increased the strength of the team was the deal with the Nationals, which sent Gio Gonzalez and a minor leaguer for rookie Tommy Milone, Derek Norris, Brad Peacock, and a minor leaguer. While Gonzalez won 20 games, he would have soon been a contract the A’s could not afford. The newly acquired Milone, a soft-tossing righty with an average fastball velocity of 87.7 went on to also be one of the best rookie pitchers in the American League, posting a 3.74 ERA while winning 13 games. Norris also stepped in, playing a crucial role at the catcher position as half of the platoon with George Kottaras.  All of these trades represent examples of Beane dumping established players for relatively unproven talent, yet in all three cases the unproven talent was able to significantly contribute the A's success in 2012; this is a great tribute to the effectiveness of the A's scouting department.. These three trades, along with a trade with the Rockies for Seth Smith and the signings of journeymen Jonny Gomes and Brandon Moss, are all examples of Beane’s ability to trade and acquire underutilized cheap talent.

Though the 2002 season will probably be most remembered when people look at the Billy Beane’s career as General Manager, it is the 2012 season that is by far his finest so far. Unlike 2002, in 2012, Beane did not have the luxury of marching out three all-star quality starters (Barry Zito, Mark Mulder, and Tim Hudson). Instead, in 2012, Beane not only had to piece together a lineup full of mostly unknown veterans and rookies, but he also had to construct a pitching staff of underrated parts as well.

Beane’s ability to assemble talent as well as manager Bob Melvin’s coaching staff’s ability to maximize it, through the implementation of platoons and pitching strategy, led to the 2012 Oakland A’s far exceeding anyone’s expectations and the revival of the belief in Moneyball in its original city.

World Baseball Classic: At the Forefront of MLB's Efforts to Globalize the Game

Israel in the World Baseball Classic

As I sat and watched the Israel vs. Spain final of the World Baseball Classic Qualifier 1 on Sunday evening, I could not help but think about how awesome and underrated an event the World Baseball Classic is.  With every run the Spain team managed late in the game their fans would dance on top of the dugout, while on the opposite side the numerous Israeli fans clung to the flags draped across their backs with every stressful momentum change.  The atmosphere surrounding the game was both exuberant and tense, creating the type of drama only sports can provide.  After winning in thrilling fashion in extra innings, the Spanish team jubilantly ran around the field as if they just won the World Series, displaying emotion rarely exhibited in a professional baseball game and proving that this game truly mattered to the players as much as it did to the fans.

Having Jewish heritage on my father’s side I was quite distraught following Spain's defeat of the Israeli's, however, it began to occur to me that I was not distraught because Israel simply lost and would not be attending the 2013 World Baseball Classic in March. I was distraught because of the lost opportunity for the growth of baseball in Israel, and instead, this opportunity would now deservedly belong to Spain.

While the World Baseball Classic seems to still only have a lackluster following in the U.S., primarily due to many owner’s fear of injury and reluctance to let star player’s participate, the event looks to use its international popularity to increase growth of the sport in other countries in 2013. The newly implemented qualifier system has expanded the field from 16 to 28 countries for this version of the event, allowing countries such as Spain, Israel, Germany, Brazil, Columbia, Chinese Taipei and others to participate for the first time. This expansion of the field reveals Major League Baseball plans to use the World Baseball Classic as far more than just another revenue generator.

The World Baseball Classic serves as a means in which Major League Baseball can promote the sport and slowly start to infiltrate new markets. While baseball’s popularity has spread like wildfire in certain Latin American and Asian countries, the sport has seen limited growth in Europe, South America, and Africa. The World Baseball Classic along with several other initiatives such as the MLB International European Baseball Academy, a multiple week academy designed to grant exposure to ballplayers from Europe, New Zealand, and Africa, hope to change this by sparking increased interest in the sport.

The World Baseball Classic Qualifier 2, which was also held this past weekend, but in Regensburg, Germany, was able to garner crowds greater than 4,000 showing that interest in the sport in Europe does exist. In 2011 Alex Liddi became the first participant of the European Baseball Academy to make his major league debut for the Seattle Mariners, and he is only one of the 63 Europeans to ink contracts with a Major League club since the academy’s inception in 2005. Along with the MLB International European Baseball Academy, there are currently 17 other baseball developmental academies in Europe. Major League Baseball hopes that an increase in European teams involved with the World Baseball Classic will continue the positive growth of baseball on the continent, by placing their National teams at the international epicenter of the game.

While baseball seems to be making steady gains in Europe, it has hit developmental roadblocks elsewhere. In 2009, it was announced that the Rays were going to open up a baseball academy in Marilia, Brazil to develop local talent. However, complications with the Brazilian Baseball and Softball Confederation and the city hall of Marilia have forced that plan to fall through. Yet, the interest of the Rays to build a developmental academy in Brazil is evidence that many feel Brazil has the potential to be a successful market for the sport.  Major League Baseball hopes that Brazil's participation in the World Baseball Classic qualifier will act as a catalyst for future growth of baseball in Brazil as well as possibly the rest of South America.

Baseball has also struggled to penetrate the Chinese market as well. A 2010 article in The Economist describes MLB’s efforts:

“Despite a big promotional budget, MLB has not made much of an impression. It has brought branded clothing to Chinese stores, but not balls or bats. Fields are rare.” 

China, who will participate in its third World Baseball Classic this March, is evidence that in order for baseball to increase in popularity, it must have a grassroots foundation. No matter how much exposure the sport receives through marketing, the media, or an event like the World Baseball Classic, without a strong foundation at the youth level, the growth of the sport will be substantially limited.

Whether or not the World Baseball Classic ever reaches ultra-high popularity levels in the United States, there is no doubt that its impact on the global development of the game is remarkable and will not be fully understand for years to come. Not only does the World Baseball Classic increase revenue for Major League Baseball through ticket and apparel sales, sponsorships, and television rights, but it creates exposure to the sport in formerly undeveloped baseball regions. With the formation of new leagues and academies worldwide the talent base for the league will only increase in the future, creating a better product and an increased fan base not only for the World Baseball Classic, but Major League Baseball as well.

The Knicks' Suffering: Dolan's Fault?

A frustrated Carmelo Anthony

As always, views expressed by individual writers do not, in any way, represent the views of the Cornell ILR Sports Business Society. 

In February 201l, there was pandemonium in New York, as the city's beloved Knicks traded for “superstar” Carmelo Anthony. The trade for Carmelo offered Knicks fans a sense of hope that the team would finally be in legitimate competition for an NBA title. However, since the trade, the Knicks have been hampered by continuity issues and lingering injuries, leaving the team in a state of mediocrity. As the 2012-2013 season approaches, the once optimistic view of success has all but faded. As a frustrated fan, it is easy to blame the current Knicks for their shortcomings, but the true fault runs in the organization, starting with owner James Dolan, and his refusal to commit to a true rebuilding process.


For the past 12 years, the Knicks have been repeatedly haunted by a front office that continues to make the same mistakes. Instead of bottoming out and actually rebuilding the team with young talent through the draft - an approach proven successful by the Oklahoma City Thunder - the front office has decided it is better to trade for and to sign overpaid middle of the pack “star” players. The list of overpaid veterans the Knicks have acquired in the last 12 years includes Antonio McDyess, Stephon Marbury, Zach Randolph, Eddy Curry, Jalen Rose, Steve Francis, Tracy McGrady, and now Carmelo Anthony

Marbury and Anthony have been able to lead the Knicks to three first round playoff appearances, but the other players mentioned can be considered complete disasters, as the team has only finished above .500 twice during that span. In order to acquire players, such as Eddy Curry and Tracy McGrady, the Knicks gave away draft picks, which have turned into players such as All Star LaMarcus Aldridge and impact defensive center Joakim Noah

In 2008, when the Knicks hired famed executive Donnie Walsh as President of Basketball Operations, it seemed as if the team was finally headed in the right direction. After a few years of working to get under the cap, in 2011 the Knicks emerged as an exciting young team led by newly signed Amare Stoudemire, accompanied by draft picks Danilo Gallinari and Wilson Chandler. However the trade deadline deal for Carmelo Anthony, in which the Knicks gave up, Gallinari, Chandler, starting point guard Raymond Felton, as well as four future draft picks, signaled the Knicks had fallen for the same trap. What was more intriguing were reports that James Dolan stepped in at the last moment to make sure the deal went through. Adding to the suspicion that there was dissent amongst the Knicks front office, Donnie Walsh chose to leave the team at the end of the season. Although Carmelo Anthony might be a class above several of the other players the Knicks have traded for, his selfish play as well as lack of postseason success should have been a red flag for the organization.

Fans are still flocking to the Garden

The primary reasons suggested for owner James Dolan’s continued pursuit of overpaid middle of the pack stars comes from the claim that the Knicks revenue would suffer greatly if they were an absolutely terrible team. However, there are several financial factors that prove this is far from true. 

Despite not advancing past the first round of the playoffs for the past 12 seasons, the Knicks are still currently the second highest valued NBA franchise at $780 million, according Forbes. Also, the Knicks have been in the top 10 in the league in attendance for all 12 of those years. The primary evidence, however, comes from the 2005-06 season.

That year the Knicks finished with their worst record during the aforementioned 12-year span at 23-59. However, they still finished sixth in the league in attendance, averaging close to 19,000 fans per game. What James Dolan continues to misunderstand is that New York basketball fans are intelligent basketball fans. The true Knicks fan would not lose allegiance to the team over a bad season or two if they saw the team building towards the future through the draft. As the beginning of the 2011 season showed, a young and exciting team that hustled and played hard every night would truly bond with the city.

 For the past 12 years James Dolan has been content producing a mediocre product and benefiting solely on New York’s craving of basketball, instead of operating the team following a true plan with potential for long term on-court success and unimaginable profits for the franchise. Going forward a fan can only hope that whether or not the Knicks long term commit to Carmelo Anthony or not, they will finally learn from their mistakes and focus on building the team through the draft and by acquiring role players without burdensome contracts.